BOLD TO 182/62 in the Employment extra order of the categors of Bordine was reading surprise to the last to new a set out of Pebruary 1968 in the present of the finds to be best decimal for a policy of the year,

Guidalance That they will the tropical the territory recognized to the matter engine MEMORANDOM FOR COLONEL LA J. LEGERE Force David was of the Mary Countries over the 2017 1700FIGE OF THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: O.Estimate of: Burppean Mill Build-up Over the Next Year of for a short term build-up terrired on authorization article over Berlin, and of Line Reference is made to your 10 Tebruary telephone request for an in: informal MATO Affairs. (European Begion, OASD/ISA) summary (one for two 1270) pages) of the above subject presering the following: the oxfort, or producting a bigher platent of forces. That it was a the agent communic early an takes whow have our European MATO Allies responded to the Berling was crisisant, throughpostly, the former generators, and the use of the contract lareline it is presymmed and a light

b. What would be the effect on force build-up by our European MATO iallies during the mext year if, during that period of time, thereby we were ind change in the present state of affairs, day, no worsening or relevation of the Berlin ericist will division to him "A sed organise the easts, elements and multiple with their term personal experience and an edulateinstratively swinderiche basis of in above, how would hard one year from now on was sing stand with respect to the Soviet Bloc, i.e., better off, worse off, or peaced the comercianted by 1 April 1962), the bigs of the fewers in the R. J. should by mainteined. This program is a special of the connect with the U.S. tor

Southe Summary, you requested is attached as an enclosure. In this connection, you may wish to contact Mr. Bromley Smith in regard to information on Soviet Bloc and MATO build-up furnished him by memorania dated 29 December 1961 and 4 January 1962. by instituting but diving one to the arriver of the regard to the Real of April.

If the Alsorian problem is enthick to him owing some one Present wall parabolds returns from more ill stations to sist a sono tello one neiteral educati roturning full three girtheous. The wisioned welled owns from the divisions so the unutinous, representate and in the configurations and defined and surrougher the land force strength R. M. Miner Corresp.

Colonel, USA

d. Die Anvien dens very little to Deputy Director's children darries torn Fall or 1961, the lighting approx to European Region was tricke position division considerations of the above a second of the first residence of the first residence of the second consideration of the second consider 1 Enclosure as the southful most observable to 48 to take anne i brouge mobbe Begeneren. de

UNCLASSIFIED The Street of the Children State named 1950 Coll Control & suchthan control with a the second of a property of the property condition well because the his more than the his his time. The the time the terms of the

รถมรัสสมรัส ครั้งสมรูป และ พ.ศ. on Tomovall of All Sections

Executive Order 11632

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: CECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. ..

DCD DIR 5200.10

is document becomes



ESTIMATE OF EUROPEAN NATO BUILD-UP OVER THE HEXT YEAR

UNCLASSIFIED.


- 1. Assumption: That the East-West crisis especially as it relates to Berlin and Central Europe is not fed by new incidents and pressures on the part of the Soviets or East Germans for a period of one year.
- 2. Questions: Now have our European MATO Allies responded to the Berlin crisis? What would be the effect on the force build-up of the NATO countries over the next year under the assumption outlined in paragraph 1 above?
 - deneral, Although there was considerable pressure in RATO for a short term build-up toward an anticipated crisis over Berlin, many of the actions taken under the stimulus of Secretary Rusk's presentation before the MAC on 8 August 1961 and the SACKUR "Flan of Action: MATO Europe" were actually long term and should have the effect of providing a higher plateau of forces. That is, some of the most dramatic actions taken were accelerations of actions that were about to be taken in any event. Consequently, the forces generated should not be affected by a leveling off of pressures; over Berlin.
 - b. Germany: The Berlin crisis set in motion a series of actions by the FRG which should maintain momentum for at least one year. The Germans were able to commit their minth division to SACEUR and organize the tenth, eleventh and twelfth with short term personnel actions such as administratively retaining personnel on active duty. If legal sction is completed on raising the term of conscription from 12 to 18 months (now estimated to be passed by Bundestag by 1 April 1962), the higher force levels in the FRG should be maintained. This program is supported by agreement with the U.S. for common item logistics support. There is good reason to believe the Germans will maintain and improve their new force level.
 - c. France: The French took credit for responding to the Berlin crisis by returning two divisions to the continent from Algero in the Fall of 1961. If the Algerian problem is settled in the coming year, the French will probably return two more divisions to the continent and have talked about returning full three divisions. Two to three additional French divisions on the continent, reorganized and in position to reinforce BACEUR, would strengthen the land force strength of BACEUR's forces.
 - d. UK: Having done very little toward the Berlin build-up during the Yall of 1961, the British cannot be expected to improve their position under conditions of the above assumption. In fact, there will most certainly be a slight reduction in the number of personnel in the BAOR over the next year even though the actual number of units is not reduced.
 - e. Netherlands: The Dutch responded to Berlin crisis by extending the conscription period 2 months, increasing the manning levels of NATO units and temporarily moving one light brigade to Germany. No change in the "crisis" atmosphere would probably result in a Dutch return to original

S' S' UNCLASSIFIED

CONSCINUTE OF S YEAR INTERVALS:

500 BIY 5800, 10

Copy . 2 of _ 7 _ Copies



UNCLASSIFIED

of forces.

f. Belgium: M-Day divisions in Germany have been augmented but are still short by 3,000 enlisted personnel. Both Army and Air Force are short of technicians. Softening of the Berlin crisis and extensive negotiations would not tend to cause Belgium to ease back to previous manning levels to any great extent since the Belgian building was not primarily in response to the Berlin crisis.

g. Italy: Italy took some significant short term actions such as accelerated training and equipment procurement, but the affects are not expected to be long term.

hat Dermarks A reduction in level of the "crisis" would probably accelerate plans to reduce the current 16 month conscription period and allow manning levels to become even lower. Internal pressures for increased defense spending would probably suffer.

1. Norway: Although M-Day units had slight improvements in manning levels, no significant build-up was achieved. A leveling off of the "crisis", would probably result in gradual decline of manning levels and defense spending.

j. tGreece: The strength of the Army was increased from 118,000 to 128,000; the manning levels of M-Day units were thereby raised to 76%. Training of non-organic support units has been intensified. The Greek military effort is almost entirely dependent upon external support.


k. Turkeys The menning level of M-Day divisions was raised to 915 (except for officers and NCO's) and 1st Echelon divisions from 45% to 81%. Shorteges of regular personnel and skilled technicians remain an important yeakness. Efforts to improve the Turkish military posture will require increased U.S. MAP support and grant aid.

1. Portugal and Luxembourg: The Berlin crisis has had no impact on these countries.

m. Summary: It is concluded that the units made available to SACEUR as a result of the Berlin crisis will be maintained. Except for Germany and France there may be a slight reduction in the manning over the period under the assumed conditions. Thus, to a total of 21 2/3 divisions (including U.S. and Canada) assigned to Central European Forces on 1 July 1961 there has already been added one German and two French divisions for a total of 24 1/3 divisions. This total could be increased to 30 divisions by the end of the year if France and Germany each add three more divisions.



aı



UNCLASSIFIED

estion: On the basis of paragraph 2 above, how would NATO one year from now stand with respect to the Soviet Blog, i.e., better off, worse off, or the same? DOTE:

a. Within the framework of the current NATO strategic concept (i.e., no concept of limited war with the Soviets; use nuclear vespons at the outset except for local hostile actions, infiltrations and incursions) NATO will remain the same versus the Soviet Bloc in that the current nuclear superiority of the West will remain a deterrent on major Soviet

b. Within the framework of the strategic concept envisioned by the 21 April 1961 U.S. Policy Directive on NATO (i.e., halt Soviet forces now in or rapidly deployable to Central Europe for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate the wider risks of the course on which they are embarked) there would be only a very slight achievement a MATO capability to carry out such a concept. Given the imbalance of non-nuclear forces which will exist a year from now, it is considered that the Soviets could rapidly effect a major penetration of the main MATO defenses and thus place . MATO non-nuclear forces in a situation where they could no longer cope with the Soviet non-nuclear attack. The questions that must that be explored are: What would be the effect on Soviet forces deep in Germany of nuclear strikes on the UBSR? Would the Soviets, despite mutual use of muclear weapons, overrun Western Europe? If the enswer to the latter question is negative, then the situation of NATO versus the Soviet Blog one year from now will have worsened.

c. Within the framework of the mutual nuclear deterrent which will exist in 1966, a MATO increase to 30 divisions by the end of this year can be considered as insignificant. In order to escape the dilemma of 1966, NATO should achieve prior to that time a capability to meet any Soviet non-nuclear aggression with non-nuclear means. In this sense, time is running out and the situation of NATO versus the Soviet Bloc one year from now will have greatly worsened.

Was.

UNCLASSIFIED